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Assessing student teamwork and giving marks to a group has always been difficult 
for teachers (Kaufman D, 2000). How to be fair regarding the involvement of every 
member of the group? How to correctly evaluate the dynamics of the group, the role 
and contribution of each student to the team? How to distinguish genuine collective 
work? These are questions that are not easy to answer (Kuisma, R, 2007). The task 
is even harder when the work given to the students is itself intentionally complex. 
At Telecom Bretagne, we want to prepare the students to face complex problems 
by giving them complex projects. Teachers therefore, have to deal with a marking 
task of equivalent complexity. An as fair as possible marking process has then to be 
elaborated taking into account pertinent indicators for teamwork and individual 
contributions. Our working hypothesis was that involving students in self and peer 
assessment would reveal interactions within the group, individual involvement and 
group adaptability, in short: the group dynamics. 
This paper analyses different iterations of a marking process over a four years 
period, involving both students and teachers. We discuss the lessons learned from 
this experimentation and correlated difficulties. 
1 COURSE UNIT DESCRIPTION 
This course unit addresses third year students of an apprenticeship based program. 
During their first and second years in Telecom Bretagne, students follow basic 
courses and communication training in project management. So they are supposed 
to be able to manage simple projects at the end of their second year. 
In the course unit addressed here, students have to deal with a real Customer’s 
request and perform a technical and economic study. Working outside the field of 
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their technical skills in Telecommunication / Networking/Information Technology, 
students have to interact with different stakeholders. These can be a Customer, the 
Steering Committee, a Communication Coach or Technical Experts. The pedagogical 
objectives of this third year course are to give the students the ability to manage 
Customer requirements analysis, project planning, monitoring and reporting, risk 
mitigation, internal and external communication, team building and human 
relationships in the context of a large project team. 
The class is split into two large teams of about 15 students who work in parallel on 
the same subject. Each team acts as a virtual company and has to decide its own 
organisation (choice of a project leader, design of the Organisational Breakdown 
Structure, task estimation and distribution). For this purpose, students can benefit 
from the help and advice of a Communication Coach and from a Steering Committee 
(Le Goff-Pronost et al, SEFI 2014). 
The course consists of 63 hours of face-to-face classes (conferences and tutored 
workshops) on one day per week over a total period of three months. In addition, 
students must work autonomously to comply with the strict delay constraints set by 
the Customer.  
In order to stimulate students’ capability to deal with changing environments, 
uncertainty and stress, some unexpected events are triggered during the project by 
the Steering Committee. For instance, customer’s requirements or the project 
schedule can be changed or an audit imposed. During the project, each team has to 
produce both technical deliverables (initial specification document, intermediate 
report, final technical report) and methodological (project management plan, 
periodical dashboard and final methodological report). At the end of the project, a 
defence in front of the Customer and the Steering Committee summarises the main 
technical and methodological results achieved by the groups. 
2 SCORE DISTRIBUTION AND RATING PROCESS  
 “It is hard to evaluate how much knowledge or skills one individual student has 
demonstrated from doing a group project” (Zhang B., 2009). Another difficulty in a 
team work is to assess individual work, individual performance and distribute the right 
mark to each student (Conway and al., 1993; Lejk and al., 1996; Lejk and Wyvill, 
2001; Li, 2001; Johnston and Miles, 2004). So, the challenges of score distribution 
are to approach a fair distribution of marks, to encourage teamwork and to 
discourage free riders and individualistic behaviour. Giving the same mark to all 
group members is a conventional method. But, this can be a discouragement factor. 
Free riders obtain the same score as hard workers. Different methods can be used to 
derive an individual mark from a group assessment. (Lejk and al. 1996) review the 
different methods. One possibility is peer assessment (Earle, 1986, Zhang A. 2012) 
rather than teacher only assessment. Peer assessment involves students actively 
participating in their own assessment. However, some difficult choices occur: open or 
secret ratings, single holistic mark or derived from a combination of criteria, who 
gives marks to whom? (Sharp, 2006). (Kozanitis 2005) underlined the risks of the 
peer assessment: advantageous marks to their friends, collusion in the team for good 
marks, tendency to give average marks to all, influence of leaders, free-riders. All 
authors agree on the necessity to familiarise students with the peer assessment 
processes (questionnaire, grids and criteria) during the project. 
In this article, we question the link between the mark given by a teacher or by peers 
to a student for his work in a group project and the dynamics of the group. Usually, 
group dynamics include the interaction process and communication, the implicit and 
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explicit rules and the affinities between the members. Are teachers able to 
understand the dynamics of a group and produce a mark which includes the value of 
positive or negative dynamics? In peer assessment, do students take into account 
what is really happening in the working group and try to distribute the scores based 
on this fact?  
In our case, we have to assess teamwork skills, teamwork process and teamwork 
production. But, we are unable to observe the exact contribution of each member in a 
group. One reason is the large size of the group and a second is the large scope 
given to students to decide how they work together. However, during periodic 
methodology discussions, teachers invite students to report any difficulties faced with 
team working. Some teachers act as observers during timetable project activity. But 
they couldn’t assess the real participation of each student as most interactions are 
remote and digital. The Steering Committee asks students to mention the number of 
worked hours in an open dashboard. But this quantitative indicator does not 
necessarily include all the group dynamics dimensions. Furthermore, students have 
to fill individual questionnaires about project management and communication skills 
before and after the unit. They also have to write personal reports on their 
experiences in this project. They analyse their difficulties, skills progression, roles 
and make their own participation assessment for the project. The following issues 
were mentioned by the students: role of the different stakeholders, quality of internal 
and external communication, motivation, human relationships, excessive or unequal 
workload and capacity to gain new skills. The aim of this student feedback is to 
enable the students and teachers to analyse the skills evolutions. 
We choose to let each team allocate individual marks from the team score given by 
the Steering Committee. This rule is given at the beginning of the project and 
teachers do not take part in negotiations and do not change any mark. This unique 
mark is a mean value from different scores from the final report, the defence for both 
technical production and project management. It is mandatory that the group keeps 
the same average mark given by the Steering Committee. Students must choose 
their own algorithm for individualised mark distribution. They have the possibility not 
to differentiate scores between the team members even though this would mean free 
riders would not be punished.  
3 SCORE DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OVER FOUR YEARS  
We have observed eight groups (from GrA to GrH) over four consecutive years.  
At the beginning of the first year (year1), the Steering Committee had not yet decided 
to offer to the students the opportunity to redistribute the score at the end of the 
project. Consequently, all the group members whether deeply involved project 
manager or free riders got the same mark. This appeared to us unfair. We then 
suggested to the groups they could be allowed to distribute or not the group score 
with their own algorithm. From questionnaires over the last two years, Table 1 shows 
that most of the students agree with the principle of score distribution. 
 
Table 1. Students’ opinion on score distribution (in %) 
 
Year Do not at all agree Not agree Agree Completely agree 
year3 11,8  23,5 47,1 17,6 
year4 0  0 52,9 47,1 
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3.1 The groups that did not distribute their scores 
For both GrA and GrB on year 1, the score distribution proposal was only suggested 
to students at the end of the course. During the students vote to choose whether the 
distribution could be applied or not, the least involved students, who were the 
majority, voted against. To explain their vote, they argued, not without reason that it 
was not in the original contract. 
Since that first experience, we have replayed this course three times (year2, year3 
and year4) with six groups in all (GrC-GrD, GrE-GrF-and GrG-GrH respectively). 
Among these six groups, three did not distribute their scores (GrC, GrE and GrG), so 
one group per year. The reasons for this choice are variable. For GrC in year2, the 
score of 16/20 was not distributed to avoid conflicts in the group since the project 
was well assessed and overall well managed. For GrE in year3, the project started 
very badly in terms of organisation. Consequently, the Steering Committee 
conducted an audit of the group revealing a lack of leadership, poor delegation of 
tasks and low group cohesion. After this, the group reacted well and set up a new 
and effective organisation. The new growing momentum continued until the end of 
the project and GrE did not want to break this new dynamic by distributing their final 
score of 12.5/20. Finally, GrG on year4, did not distribute their mark 14.5/20 to avoid 
disputes within the group, as for GrC. 
3.2 The groups that distributed their scores 
On the contrary, GrD, GrF and GrH distributed their score using the different 
distribution algorithms described below. 
In year2, GrD had a score of 17/20 thanks to a good group dynamics and excellent 
technical work. For the distribution, some students told the project manager they 
agreed to give him some of their own marks. He then proposed that each student 
distribute three half points to the persons of his choice. This redistribution, accepted 
by all, resulted in assigning ratings of 21/20 to the project manager. Finally, he 
reserved a personal score of 19.5 and redistributed the additional 1.5 points to his 
worthy colleagues. At the end of the process, the variation ranged from -1 to +2.5 
points for this positive score distribution. 
GrF in year3 had a score of 14/20 justified by strong management and a rather good 
level technical study. In fact, GrF organisation was based on a quality leadership 
from both the project manager and work package leaders. The rest of the group had 
simply carried out the tasks requested by the managers. At the end of the module, 
the project manager and work package leaders decided to distribute the scores. So, 
they gave themselves extra points and consequently, removed some points from the 
basic contributors. Finally, the process was announced to the group which accepted 
this authoritarian redistribution. The mark modifications ranged from -2 to +1.8 points. 
Finally, GrH in year4 had a score of 14/20 with a medium efficient communication but 
reasonably good technical study. GrH chose to distribute the final score because 
some members of the group reported that one student did not meet the group 
charter. This document was established and signed by all members at the beginning 
of the project. It seemed that, despite warnings by the project manager, this student 
had not produced the desired quality of work within the allotted time. According to the 
charter, the student had to be penalised. The project manager did not know how to 
handle this stressful situation. He discussed with the Steering Committee who 
advised him to base his decision on facts in order to punish fairly. The meeting for 
the score distribution was a kind of court which judged this student on his activity in 
the project but also on his history well before the project. This court severely 
penalised the student by removing 5 points so that the student failed the module. 
After discussion with the stakeholders, the Steering Committee found that this 
 43rd Annual SEFI Conference  June 29 - July 2, 2015 Orléans, France 
 
student has been stigmatised for his previous behaviour and that the penalty of 5 
points was not justified. Note that some of the other students in the group had not 
completed their work on time and were not troubled by the court. Given the 
magnitude of the sanction, the project manager personally decided to give 1 point 
from his own account to the student. Finally, the variation ranged from -4 to +1 points 
which showed the sanction applied to the offending student. 
Table 2 summarizes the results about score distributions in the last three years. 
 
Table 2. Groups score distributions 
 




GrA 12.7 Announced at the 
end of the project Not applicable GrB 14.1 
Year2 
GrC 16 No score distribution N. A. 
GrD 17 Positive  -1 à +2.5 
Year3 
GrE 12.5 No score distribution N. A. 
GrF 14 Authoritarian -2.0 à +1.8 
Year4 
GrG 14.5 No score distribution N. A. 
GrH 14 Sanction -4 à +1 
 
4 DISCUSSION  
4.1 Analysis 
Initially, this post-project score distribution was proposed to give freedom to students 
to adjust the teachers perception and assessment. Since the average score must 
remain unchanged, we do not promote score distribution as a tool to motivate 
students or boost group dynamics. We may have naively expected that the way 
students apply adjustment would have given obvious feedback on communication 
processes or evolution of group organisations that were not simple to observe. 
The variations shown in Table 2 are an image of score distribution modes. We qualify 
as positive the GrD distribution that leads to higher gains for some students than 
losses for the majority (negative scores). This means that the most involved students 
were rewarded by the group. GrF, which distributed scores with an authoritarian 
mode, achieved symmetry between gains and losses. Finally the penalty in GrH is 
made visible by the imbalance between the loss of a single student and the gains of 
the majority. We could expect that these different score distribution modes can be 
easily correlated with specific group dynamics,  
Indeed, in two groups, the score distribution process mirrored the group evolution. In 
GrD, the success was due to a strong involvement of the leaders and a good 
communication process between team-mates, acknowledging the merits of each 
other. In GrF, the organisation evolved to an authoritarian one, where leaders decide 
and subalterns obey. In both cases, score distribution put increased stress on the 
team organisation resulting from the group dynamics. 
However, score distribution is not a simple tool. A group can show excellent 
dynamics and yet choose not to apply score distribution. In GrE, score distribution 
clearly confirmed the cohesion and solidarity the group finally achieved after facing 
and overcoming difficulties together. Nevertheless, choosing to apply the same score 
to every team member can still be a way to hide failures and thus the fact that they 
do benefit from positive group dynamics. It is not necessarily the result of strong 
solidarity within the group as in GrE! For instance, GrC and GrG equally shared their 
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score, even though the group dynamics were far from perfect. In both cases, score 
distribution was not used even if teachers expected it. 
Score distribution can be a complementary and efficient tool if the students clearly 
explain their choices. They must clearly justify why they do or do not distribute the 
group score. If they distribute, they must explain the distribution method and the 
motivation. This exercise can be a catharsis and reveal tensions that were kept 
secret. This was clearly the case in GrH until they had to distribute the score. Indeed, 
one student was the victim of the score distribution due to conflicts that were not all 
related to the project. Was this student used as a scapegoat or the result of long-term 
resentment? This was not obvious all along the project and was clearly revealed by 
the score distribution. This particular case highlighted the fact that a final approval by 
the teachers is mandatory to avoid abusive score distributions. Students and 
teachers both gain of useful feedback from this experience. We plan to systemise 
discussions about their score distribution process in future projects. 
4.2 Lessons learned and perspectives 
After 4 years and 8 different groups we conclude that the result of the score 
distribution reveals no major information about the group dynamics. It is the decision 
itself to distribute and its associated process that seem most important.  
The main limit of score distribution concerns a typical students’ behaviour: they want 
to give a good image of themselves and thus, generally try to hide internal conflicts or 
flaws. Thus, a simple use of score distribution is not sufficient. On the other hand, an 
observation of the mark distribution process selection and the discussions about the 
chosen arguments are full of teachings.  
The reasons for the rejection of score adaptation are many: equality, equity, 
simplicity, avoidance of conflict, desire to hide problems and to highlight cooperation. 
The reasons for score adaptation are also many: reward a posteriori, incentive a 
priori, research of equity, but also punishment. We have not perceived any 
correlation with ease or difficulty of the project. The way mark adjustment is used 
seems to indicate the dominating state of mind at the end of the project: desire for 
peace, finding scapegoat, acknowledging efforts, etc. Whatever the final student 
decision, the Steering Committee can never be sure consensus was actually reached 
within the group.  
Allowing students to distribute their score was naively introduced to try and reveal 
some aspects of the group dynamics. Actually, it opened a Pandora's box. The 
process has revealed behaviours that students will have to face as future managers: 
evaluate and be evaluated. We realised that assessment is not part of our training 
objectives and is seldom an objective of other courses in Telecom Bretagne. Our 
scoring distribution approach gives students the opportunity to discuss assessment 
and, for the more mature among them, identify the ethical values they want to apply 
during the process and the steps they must take to defend these values.  
We plan to expand the current learning outcome targets with an assessment issue. 
The score distribution exercise seems to be a good opportunity for this. Our four 
years of observation have given us a basic material for discussion with students after 
the analysis of their own process. We can also rely on student's experience since as 
apprentices they may encounter assessment situations in their placement 
companies. The main goal is to help students to better understand themselves and 
stakes, thanks to discussions about the different ethical values and their impact on 
group dynamics. The students have to be well prepared for this complex role of a 
manager required to assess his subordinates yearly since this assessment often 
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conditions salaries. Indeed, an incorrect use of assessment can trigger deep 
frustration and dangerously degrade group dynamics. 
CONCLUSION  
Improving workgroup assessment has been a constant concern for the Steering 
committee of the complex project course. Mixing classical teacher's assessment with 
more innovative peer assessment has definitely given a richer and more accurate 
insight of the group dynamics. Nevertheless, it has side effects that need to be 
managed. A performance measurement system strongly influences the way students 
work. So the group dynamics are largely dependent on the way students feel 
evaluated. As a consequence, introducing peer assessment gives more autonomy to 
students group on one hand but also gives them a powerful tool to influence directly 
their own organisation and dynamics. It is also an individual tool to favour 
introspective evaluation regarding personal involvement. We aim to educate future 
managers who will have to motivate teams, reward merit, fairly penalise and 
negotiate objectives and trade-offs.  
Even if students agree on peer assessment and score distribution, this agreement 
does not give the solution by itself. The methodology and ethics of the score 
distribution seem more important than the result itself. Guaranteeing fairness in score 
distribution cannot be done without external intervention - i.e. a teacher-. Over four 
years, the full assessment mechanism has been improved but has also highlighted 
this fact. The trade-off between careful but sometimes intrusive teacher monitoring 
on one side and student autonomy on the other side is still to be looked for.  
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